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 Abstract 
The paper investigates the condition of the individual qua citizen as recognised and shaped by national 
constitutional democracies and supranational law, the legal and political orders constituting European public law. 
It firstly spells out the notion of ‘subjectification’ and its peculiar manifestation in the context of European 
public law. Then, it offers an excursus on the subjectification of the citizen by looking at its main constitutive 
dimensions: belonging, rights and participation. The excursus examines three distinct phases of the evolution of 
European integration. Firstly, it looks at the social state era and the affirmation of the constitutional subject, a 
type of citizen devised essentially within national constitutional democracies with supranational law offering just 
additional rights for the economically active. Secondly, it explores the transformation of the constitutional 
subject prompted by the expansion of supranational law and the emergence of the ‘advanced liberalism’ agenda. 
Finally, the paper evaluates the condition of the citizen during the financial crisis, a stage which probably 
witnesses the twilight of the constitutional subject as conceived of in the social state era. The upshot of this 
excursus contradicts more conventional accounts for subjectivity in the EU emphasising a civic turn in the 
understanding of the individual: if the relationships between individuals and the governmental projects 
constituting European public law are considered, the evolution of European integration is paralleled by an 
involution of citizenship. Or, at least, of the idea of citizenship imagined in national constitutional democracies 
in post-World War II. 
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 1 
Introduction 
The condition of individuals is a key concern for both national constitutional democracies and supranational law, 
the legal and political orders constituting European public law.
1
 Yet the relationships between individuals and 
those governmental projects only at a superficial level may appear similar. Despite their common acceptance of 
human dignity, fundamental rights, rule of law and democracy as founding values,
2
 supranational law and 
constitutional democracies conceive of and govern the individual from remarkably different perspectives. Due to 
their institutional and ideological specificities, those projects recognize in subjects different capacities, interests 
and aspirations and, critically, exert on them similarly different defining pressures.  
This paper analyses these processes of subjectification by taking as a focal point the individual qua citizen. It 
firstly spells out in more detail the notion of subjectification and its peculiar manifestation in the context of 
European public law. Then, it offers an excursus on the subjectification of the citizen by looking at its main 
constitutive dimensions: belonging, rights and participation. The excursus examines three distinct phases of the 
evolution of European integration. Firstly, it looks at the social state era and the affirmation of the constitutional 
subject, a type of citizen devised essentially within national constitutional democracies with supranational law 
offering just additional rights for the economically active. Secondly, it explores the transformation of the 
constitutional subject prompted by the expansion of supranational law and the emergence of the ‘advanced 
liberalism’ agenda. Finally, the paper evaluates the condition of the citizen during the financial crisis, a stage 
which probably witnesses the twilight of the constitutional subject as conceived of in the social state era. The 
upshot of this excursus contradicts more conventional accounts for subjectivity in the EU emphasising a civic 
turn in the understanding of the individual: if the relationships between individuals and the governmental 
projects constituting European public law are considered, the evolution of European integration is paralleled by 
an involution of citizenship. Or, at least, of the idea of citizenship imagined in national constitutional 
democracies in post-World War II. 
Subjectification, European public law and citizenship 
Liberal and democratic legal orders are premised on the idea that government should conform to the nature of 
those governed.
3
 Accordingly, the relationship between the individual and the legal and political order is usually 
construed in terms of recognition: to live up to their liberal and democratic credentials, governments are 
expected to reflect in their structures and policies individuals’ values, aspirations and interests. Yet, the process 
through which this alignment occurs is more interactive. Nikolas Rose, for instance, claims that policies and 
institutional arrangements do not simply recognise individuals’ preferences.4 The relationship between 
government and those subject to its rule involves also a different and opposite vector: individuals are acted upon 
by government and, thus, it is their preferences which are also shaped by government’s projects.5 Put differently, 
besides being recognized in our autonomy of subjects, we are also targets of regulatory strategies exerting 
defining pressures on us.
6
 According to this process – with Rose, we may call it ‘subjectification’7  
                                                     
1I have investigated the composite nature of European public law in Il diritto pubblico europeo nella prospettiva dei conflitti 
(Cedam, 2013).   
2 Article 2 TEU. 
3 N. Rose, Inventing Our Selves – Psychology, Power and Personhood (CUP, 1996), 119. 
4 Ibidem, 119. 
5 Ibidem, 121-122, where it is observed how, most of the times, alignment of individuals’ preferences with the goals of 
government is the product not of imposition of politically determined standards, but of free choice and rational 
persuasion. 
6 Ibidem, 152. 
7 Ibidem, 10. 
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– the alignment between government and governed ensues from a more circular dynamic based on both the 
recognition of individuals’ nature and its shaping by government operation. 
When observed in the context of current European institutional settings, subjectification plays out in a rather 
peculiar way. It appears first of all as a complex process. Owing to the composite structure of European public 
law and, namely, its articulation in supranational law and national constitutional democracies, individuals are 
often situated at the intersection of multiple governmental strategies with distinct and not necessarily coherent 
policy goals, rationales and ideologies. If in principle this exposes them to both the promises and biases of each 
governmental project, their actual subjectification results from a more complicated equation including also 
structural and temporal variables. The structural element goes to the pluralist configuration of European public 
law.
8
 Given that neither of its constitutive components boasts exclusive authority on individuals, European 
public law generates fragmented subjectivities reflective of both governmental strategies. The quality and 
strength of the pressures effectively exerted is temporally dependent. It is so because, firstly, the nature of both 
supranational law and national constitutional democracies has known markedly different seasons, all registered 
in their currently stratified identity. Secondly, also the relationships between those governmental projects has 
evolved over time, alternating phases of peaceful coexistence with more turbulent phases of competition. As a 
result, a study of subjectivity in contemporary Europe must firstly trace the variety of defining pressures exerted 
over time on individuals by both national constitutional democracies and supranational law. Moreover, it is also 
at the varying relationships between the latter that one must look: it is by examining their particular 
combinations that the actual defining pressures exerted on the individual in a given period can be decoded. 
A valuable focal point to test these propositions is offered by citizenship,
9
 the distinctive legal status and 
political ideal
10
 regarding the condition of the individual in a polity.
11
 To understand the subjectification of the 
citizen in European public law, it is not sufficient to focus on how its core ideal of civic equality
12
 is developed 
in, respectively, supranational law and national constitutional democracies. To account for the recognition and 
shaping of citizen’s qualities in Europe a broader perspective must be embraced including all the three defining 
dimensions of citizenship.
13
 Belonging is the first aspect requiring investigation. In this regard, analysis is 
expected to ascertain who the citizen is with a view to possible grounds of internal (gender, ethnicity, class) or 
external (nationality) exclusions. Pertaining to this dimension is also the detection of the locus and degree of 
collective identification of individuals with a particular political community. The second constitutive dimension 
of citizenship relates to the rights associated with membership in a polity. In this field, analysis indicates the set 
of entitlements and provisions viewed as necessary to consider each individual member worthy of equal respect 
and concern. Of particular importance within this set of rights are those enabling individuals to voice their 
interests and aspirations in the public sphere. This goes to the third dimension of citizenship, that of 
participation, a field which can be broadened to encompass also the institutional infrastructures employed to 
mediate the conflicts generated by participation and to translate collective self-determination into policy. 
  
                                                     
8 N. MacCormick, ‘The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now’ (1995) 1 European Law Journal, 264. On pluralist paradigms, 
see  N. Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism – The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (OUP, 2010), 71-78. 
9 Alternative subjective characterizations may be equally valid and illuminating. On the subjectification of the consumer, see 
my ‘Assembling the fractured European consumer’ (2010) 36 European Law Review, 362. 
10 J. Shaw, ‘Citizenship: contrasting dynamics at the interface of integration and constitutionalism’ in P. Craig, G. de Bùrca 
(eds), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP, 2011), 575.  
11 On citizenship as a status distinct from other types of political affiliation and social relationships see R. Bellamy, 
Citizenship: a very short introduction (OUP, 2008), 2-3. 
12 Ibidem, 17. 
13 Ibidem, 12-17. 
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The affirmation of the constitutional subject in the social state era 
The first period reviewed in our excursus is that extending from the end of World War II to the entry into force 
of the Single European Act (1987). It is the period in which both the governmental projects constituting 
European public law are defined in their distinctive characteristics. On the one hand, national constitutional 
democracies institutionalise the social question by establishing legal and political orders grounded on 
representative democracy and the protection of fundamental rights. On the other, supranational law is the vehicle 
for a regulatory project promoting market efficiency through the protection of economic freedoms and executive 
policy-making. Throughout all the social state era, European public law gravitates mainly towards national 
constitutional democracies,
14
 with supranational law performing an accessory function. A division of labour is 
established between the regulatory structure of supranational law and the redistributive mechanisms incorporated 
in national constitutional democracies.
15
 It is precisely by keeping distinct the material domains of its 
constitutive governmental projects that European public law eschews conflicts of legal authority and secures its 
overall stability.
16
  
Constitutional subjects in refounded national political communities 
The years immediately following the end of World War II are rightly remembered as a period of intense 
reconstruction and enlightened political activity in Europe. Among the many political achievements of the time, 
the affirmation of the constitutional subject is one of the most telling for it has inspired legal and political 
thinking on citizenship up until now.  
The affirmation of the constitutional subject is closely related to the refoundation of national political 
communities. In the last years of the war the idea of lifting individuals’ collective identification up to the 
European level had a certain appeal only in a restricted circle of politicians and intellectuals.
17
 So, after the end 
of the war, priority was generally given to the refoundation of national polities.
18
 Crudely, no individual had died 
for a united Europe. The sacrifices of the war had been essentially made on behalf of nation states and, critically, 
often against other European countries. National diversities and conflicts were too tangible a reality to fall into 
oblivion,
19
 so much so that uniting Europe became an ideal and a challenge assigned to the generations to come. 
The main task for the post-World War II generation was refounding national political communities. In several 
European countries the idea of belonging required to be re-imagined. The experience of the war had shown the 
dangers of building collective identification on organic factors such as ethnicity, a common language, culture 
and history. More efforts in legal and political imagination were required also to address the social question, a 
divisive issue that well before the war had disintegrated European polities.
20
 To deal with both of these concerns 
the breakthrough was considering the unity of the polity and the attachment to it more as goals to be attained 
than prerequisites of legal and political organisation.
21
 Governmental resources were employed in educational 
                                                     
14
 C. J. Bickerton, European Integration. From Nation-States to Member States (OUP, 2012), 89-90. 
15 M. Ferrera, The Boundaries of Welfare. European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection  (OUP, 
2005), 90-95. This division of labour found some recognition also in the case law of the Court of Justice (see, e.g. Case 
C-263/86, Belgian State v René Humbel and Marie-Thérèse Edel [1988] ECR I-5365). 
16 Both the Court of Justice (Case C-6/64, Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585) and national constitutional courts (see, 
e.g., Italian Constitutional Court, sent. 183/1973 (Frontini) [1974] CMLR 372) conditioned the primacy of EU law to its 
limited remit. 
17 See, e.g., A. Spinelli and E. Rossi, Il Manifesto di Ventotene – Per un’Europa libera e unita [1944] (Istituto di studi 
federalisti “Altiero Spinelli”, 1991). 
18
A. D. Smith, ‘National Identity and the Idea of European Unity’ (1992) 68 International Affairs, 62. 
19 On the importance of sacrifice and oblivion in polity building, see M. Loughlin, Sword & Scales – An Examination of the 
Relationship Between Law & Politics (Hart Publishing, 2000), 142. 
20 R. Dahrendorf, The Modern Social Conflict – An Essay on the Politics of Liberty (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988), 97, 
noting that equality had been the “hidden agenda of the second Thirty Years’ War”. 
21 G. Zagrebelsky, Il diritto mite (Einaudi, 1992), 47-49. 
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and cultural projects aimed at reinforcing or re-establishing on more civilised bases the sense of national 
belonging.
22
 The main catalysts for collective identification, however, were democratic constitutions and the 
welfare state. Democratic constitutions came to be seen as the main political achievement of a people, the 
catalogue of its aspirations but also of the legal and political tensions of modernity.
23
 The welfare state, instead, 
was the institution making tangible the promises of national membership and offering the material quid pro quo 
for citizens’ loyalty.24  
The combined effect of democratic constitutions and the welfare state was overcoming the internal exclusions 
that had tainted citizenship under liberal constitutions. By entrenching civic equality and fundamental rights as 
founding principles, democratic constitutions outlawed race, gender and census discriminations. Redistributive 
mechanisms, interventionist industrial policy and welfare programmes improved social cohesion and enabled 
individuals to become fully-fledged political subjects.
25
 
But the refoundation of national political communities did not entail only the social-democratic redefinition of 
national sites of government and a corresponding transformation of citizenship. Inbuilt in democratic 
constitutions was also the ambition of challenging the external exclusions inherent in the idea of nationality.
26
 
National constituents were aware of the insufficiencies and dangers inherent in the latter; thus, in rehabilitating 
one moderate version of it, they laid also the ground for its further relativisation. Democratic constitutions 
contained norms referring to international law that soon were employed to legitimise supranational law,
27
 a 
project that had in challenging external exclusions one of its constitutive tasks.
28
  
It is widely known that since its very beginning supranational law cultivated its particular approach to the 
subject. Much ink has been spilled to stress how the European Court of Justice in Van Gend en Loos
29
 placed the 
individual at the centre of supranational law
30
 and, by doing so, laid the ground for the creation of a transnational 
political community.
31
 To a large extent that is an overstated and questionable claim grounded only in the loftiest 
passages of that judgment.
32
 However, even for those subscribing to that reading, it may be interesting to dwell 
on the characteristics of the individual postulated by early supranational law and on the reasons justifying his 
centrality.
33
  
It may be observed that in Van Gend en Loos, the Court of Justice brackets the national affiliation of individuals. 
Those that in national quarters are considered constitutional subjects, for supranational purposes are European 
                                                     
22 R. Bellamy, above n. 11, 46. See also J-W. Müller, Constitutional Patriotism (PUP, 2007), Ch. 1. 
23 P. Costa, ‘Cittadinanza sociale e diritto del lavoro nell’Italia repubblicana’ (2009) XXIII Lavoro e diritto, 48-49. 
24 T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and social class (CUP, 1950), 47. 
25 Ibidem, 47-48. 
26
 A. J. Menéndez, ‘Which Citizenship? Whose Europe? – The Many Paradoxes of European Citizenship’ (2014) 15 German 
Law Journal, 911-912. 
27
 F. Palermo, La forma di stato dell’Unione europea. Per una teoria costituzionale dell’integrazione sovranazionale 
(Cedam, 2005), 179.  
28 J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (CUP, 1999), 250-252. 
29 Case C-26/62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue 
Administration [1963] ECR 1. 
30 See D. Halberstam, ‘The Bride of Messina: Constitutionalism and Democracy in Europe’ (2005) 30 European Law Review, 
775 and J. H. H. Weiler, ‘Van Gend en Loos: The individual as subject and object and the dilemma of European 
legitimacy’ (2014) 12 International Journal of Constitutional Law, 103. 
31 W. Maas, ‘The Origins, Evolution, and Political Objectives of EU Citizenship’ (2014) 14 German Law Journal, 798-801. 
32
 By looking at article 48 TEU, for instance, one could persuasively argue that, despite Van Gend en Loos, the heart of EU 
law is still occupied by national governments. 
33
 A. Somek, ‘The Individualisation of Liberty: Europe’s Move from Emancipation to Empowerment’ (2013) 4 
Transnational Legal Theory, 272-274. 
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individuals. In this capacity, however, they do not constitute a people.
34
 This is in part motivated by the fact that, 
as said, the European Communities could not boast the same degree of collective identification attached to 
national democratic constitutions. Yet this is also a consequence of the particular approach to the individual by 
supranational law. Early supranational law shows no interest in the political qualities of individuals for it 
conceives of them as factors of production. As such, Europeans are the points of imputation of a distinct 
catalogue of rights, but they cannot claim the same type of centrality assigned to them by democratic 
constitutions. The latter celebrate individuals as end-in-themselves.
35
 Supranational law, by contrast, looks at 
them essentially in instrumental terms.
36
 They are reached by Community norms to legitimise the Community as 
a system of governance.
37
 They are empowered by the Court of Justice to promote the private enforcement of 
supranational norms against member states.
38
 Their rights are protected essentially if coincident to supranational 
policy goals.
39
 Conceived for these purposes, the engagement of supranational law with individuals generates 
only a multitude with a common interest in peace and prosperity,
40
 a legal community grounded on the European 
tradition of freedom,
41
 where the economic potential of individuals is enhanced, while their political capacity 
remains unexpressed. 
It will be shown how more recently this original mark has developed corroding the qualities of the constitutional 
subject.
42
 Yet, in the context of the refoundation of national political communities, economic subjectivity offers 
a valuable contribution to the construction of the latter. By means of economics freedoms, supranational law 
introduces powerful legal constraints on the capacity of member states to exclude or discriminate non 
nationals.
43
 The result is not the complete overcoming of external exclusions; yet a discipline of openness 
towards the foreigner is instilled in national political communities.
44
 This is probably the most distinctive 
contribution to citizenship by supranational law in the social state era: rather than competing with national 
constitutional democracies for collective identification, it is meant essentially to lessen the disabilities of 
alienage.
45
  
  
                                                     
34 This is evident already in the preamble of the Treaty of Rome establishing the goal of  “lay[ing] the foundations of an ever 
closer union between the peoples of Europe” (Italic added). See J. H. H. Weiler, above n. 28, 327. 
35 See below section 3.2. 
36 M. Everson, ‘The Legacy of the Market Citizen’ in J. Shaw, G. Moore (eds), New Legal Dynamics of European Union 
(Clarendon Press, 1995), 86. 
37 J. H. H. Weiler, above n. 30, 98. 
38 P. Craig, ‘Once Upon a Time in the West: Direct Effect and Federalization of EEC Law’ (1992) 12 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies, 453. 
39 D. Chalmers and L. Barroso, ‘What Van Gend en Loos stands for’ (2014) 12 International Journal of Constitutional Law, 
120-122. 
40 J. H. H. Weiler, above n. 28, 241-246. 
41 D. Chalmers and L. Barroso, above n. 39,108-109. 
42 See below sections 4 and 5. 
43 See below section 3.2. 
44 J. H. H. Weiler, ‘In defence of the status quo: Europe’s constitutional Sonderweg’ in J. H. H. Weiler, M. Wind (eds), 
European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (CUP, 2003), 21-23. 
45 M. Everson, above n. 36, 76. 
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Human dignity, social rights and economic freedoms in the industrial society 
The overcoming of internal exclusions as well as the challenge to external ones testify the deep moral 
commitment inspiring the refoundation of national polities. These achievements are certainly rooted in the 
particular biography of each national legal and political order, but they can also be ascribed to the normative turn 
of international law occurring in the same years.
46
 The democratic constitutions approved immediately after the 
war find a common source of inspiration in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its underlying 
political culture. National constitutions incorporate the concept of human dignity
47
 as their foundational 
principle.
48
 Most importantly, they infuse into their legal orders its more profound normative claim: human 
beings are to be regarded as the last-order purposes of human intentions and actions; thus, any sort of 
objectification and instrumentalisation is prohibited.
49
   
All this is well known and largely uncontested. But to grasp the real nature of the normative recalibration of 
national constitutionalism, the discourse on human dignity requires some specification. In democratic 
constitutions the emerging awareness of the centrality of the individual and her rights comes in a new form. 
Locke’s vision of the individual in a state of nature detached from reality is questioned.50 The concern of the 
emerging legal and political order is the homme situé, the individual bound to the complex and dense net of 
political, social and economic relations typical of the industrial society.
51
 Within this framework, human dignity 
is filled of material content and contributes to the goal of taming the markets inherent in democratic 
constitutions.
52
 In other words, human dignity is established as a principle extending not only to the political, but 
also to the economic and social spheres.
53
  
It is against a similar normative background that the promise of social citizenship inherent in the constitutional 
subject becomes evident. To enable participation to the economic and cultural heritage of society,
54
 democratic 
constitutions comprise catalogues of fundamental rights enriched with economic and social principles.
55
 
Precisely the promise of these documents to secure the attainment of this type of economic and social goods 
marks their rupture with previous undemocratic regimes.
56
 Of particular significance is the key role assigned to 
the right to work and its corollaries,
57
 premised on the idea that in the industrial society it is essentially by 
working that individuals achieve the effective inclusion in the polity.
58
 In the ethos of the social state, work is not 
just instrumental to income but is vested with more profound private and public meanings. On a private level, 
                                                     
46 A. Moravcsik, ‘The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe’ (2000) 54 
International Organization, 217. 
47 M. Mahlmann, ‘Human Dignity and Autonomy in Modern Constitutional Orders’, in M. Rosenfeld, A. Sajó (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP, 2013), 371. 
48 See, e.g. article 1 of the German Constitution and, subsequently, article 10 of the Spanish Constitution. 
49 M. Mahlmann, above n. 47, 377. 
50 P. Costa, above n. 23, 38. 
51 G. Burdeau, La democrazia [1956] (Edizioni di Comunità, 1964), 25-41. 
52 G. Amato, ‘Il mercato nella Costituzione’ (1992) XII Quaderni Costituzionali, 8. 
53 K. Ewing, ‘Economic Rights’, in M. Rosenfeld, A. Sajó, above n. 47, 1039-1040. This idea had already emerged in article 
151 of the Weimar constitution, referring the concept of human dignity to the economic sphere. 
54 P. Costa, above n. 23, 38. 
55 Eloquent in this regard is the preamble of the French Constitution of 1946:  “ Il réaffirme solennellement les droits et 
libertés de l'homme et du citoyen consacrés par la Déclaration des droits de 1789 et les principes fondamentaux reconnus 
par les lois de la République. Il proclame, en outre, comme particulièrement nécessaires à notre temps, les principes 
politiques, économiques et sociaux ci-après ...” (Italic added). 
56 See, e.g., M. Brito Vieira and F. Carreira da Silva, ‘Getting rights right: Explaining social rights constitutionalization in 
revolutionary Portugal’ (2013) 11 International Journal of Constitutional Law, 902-904. 
57 On the individual and collective dimensions of the right to work see K. Ewing, above n. 53, 1043-1047. 
58 P. Costa, above n. 23, 43. 
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work is the most tangible way through which individuals express their personality.
59
 On a public one, work is 
viewed the source of the sacrifices through which individuals contribute to the welfare of the society and, 
ultimately, may vindicate their fair share of it.
60
 
The critical role of work is not confined to national democratic constitutions. Work occupies a central place also 
in the set of individual rights conferred by supranational law, although in this context it develops along a 
trajectory alternative to that of national democratic constitutions. In supranational law workers’ rights are not 
about redistribution and social justice but about transnational mobility.
61
 They are not meant to protect the 
individual from the risks of markets, but they offer to individuals opportunities to express themselves through 
markets.  
In supranational law, therefore, workers are conceived as agents of market integration. The current 
commodification of worker can certainly be traced back to this original trait of supranational law.
62
 Yet, when 
looked against their historical background, the mobility rights conferred to workers contribute to their human 
emancipation. The period following the end of World War II is one of intense and close control of the movement 
of persons.
63
 In its effort to challenge external exclusions, supranational law introduces detailed norms 
contrasting the key obstacles encountered by those willing to migrate to other European countries.
64
 Entry 
permissions, discriminations on the terms of payment and working conditions, hurdles to the access to social 
security and the welfare state are all targets of prima facie prohibitions.
65
 It is through their enforcement that the 
Court of Justice makes more inclusive national welfare states.
66
 For this purpose, the Court interprets generously 
the individuals’ economic qualifications in both their personal and objective scope.67 The notion of worker is a 
case in point
68
 in that it reaches prospective
69
 and former workers,
70
 their family members
71
 and extends equal 
treatment well beyond the working environment.
72
 This generosity in interpretation, however, does not imply a 
break of supranational law with its foundational market paradigm. To qualify as a point of imputation of rights 
and duties, an individual is always to prove its economic characterisation.
73
 Also in this respect the key role of 
work (or other equivalent economic qualifications) is noticeable: underpinning this early approach to free 
                                                     
59
 C. Mortati, ‘Il lavoro nella costituzione’ (1954) XXVIII Diritto del lavoro, 149-156. 
60 Ibidem, 152. 
61The main labour law and social security instruments developed at supranational level revolve around mobility and equal 
treatment, see regulation 1612/1968 and regulation 1408/1971. 
62 See below section 4.2. 
63 A. J. Menéndez, ‘European Citizenship after Martínez Sala and Baumbast: Has European Law Become More Human But 
Less Social?’ in M. Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds), The Past and the Future of EU Law. The Classics of EU Law Revisited 
on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart Publishing, 2010), 365-366. 
64 Ibidem, 366. 
65 See article 45 (2) TFEU and articles 7, 9 and 12 of regulation 1612/1968. 
66 See above section 3.1. 
67 J. Shaw, above n. 10, 584, defines these judgments as ‘proto-citizenship’ case law. 
68 But see also the broad interpretation of the notion of ‘service recipient’ in Joined cases C-286/82 and 26/83, Graziana Luisi 
and Giuseppe Carbone v Ministero del Tesoro [1984] ECR 322, and Case C-186/87, Ian William Cowan v. Trésor Public 
[1989] ECR 195. 
69 See also Case C-293/83, Françoise Gravier v City of Liège [1985] ECR 593 and Case C-39/86, Sylvie Lair v Universität 
Hannover [1988] ECR 3161. 
70 See regulation 1408/1971.  
71See article 10 of regulation 1612/1968. 
72 See, e.g., Case C-137/84, Criminal Proceeding against Robert Heinrich Maria Mutsch [1985] ECR 2681. 
73 See, e.g., Case C-168/91, Christos Konstantinidis v Stadt Altensteig [1993] ECR I-1191. 
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movement is the notion that access and equal treatment can be accorded insofar as migrants prove their 
contribution to the economic welfare of the host state.
74
  
The political profile of the constitutional subject 
The portrait of the constitutional subject in the social state era would be incomplete without an insight into its 
capacity to participate and shape the pattern of social and political life. Also in this regard democratic 
constitutions experiment with innovative solutions. To deal with the conflicts of the industrial society, 
democratic constitutions opt resolutely for the institutionalisation of the social question.
75
 Through their 
composite catalogues of fundamental rights, they legitimate opposing normative and political claims.
76
 Through 
enfranchisement, they convert the institutions of representative democracy from the protection of property-
holders to the mediation of conflicts.
77
 As a result, the idea of freedom postulated by democratic constitutions 
becomes entangled with the idea of participation: citizens are not simply protected from governmental 
encroachments on their private lives, but they are also individually and collectively involved in decisions on the 
direction of government.
78
  
Coherent with this idea is the broad political latitude allowed by democratic constitutions to constitutional 
subjects and political decision-makers. To be sure, democratic constitutions establish also principles constraining 
political institutions to protect fundamental rights.
79
 Yet, seldom such limitations compromise the freedom of 
action of national governments and legislatures. Fundamental rights operate essentially as presumptive shields 
permitting justifiable limitations,
80
 and also constitutional courts tend to interpret their task as implying a 
corrective rather than a steering function.
81
 Democratic constitutions, indeed, do not mandate a particular 
economic model or specific policy directions.
82
 Their role is to outlaw extreme economic models that would 
undermine their social and political basis.
83
 But aside from that, they only dictate governments and legislatures 
to pursue social justice, an open-ended goal compatible with broad political freedom and a wide spectrum of 
policy options.   
Given their commitment to civic participation and political mediation of conflicts, democratic constitutions 
enhance parliaments as their main political venue. In the social state era, parliamentary assemblies receive broad 
legislative mandates and extensive powers to hold executives accountable.
84
 For our analysis, however, an 
extremely important task fulfilled by parliaments in this period is that of representing and integrating the society. 
It is essentially through this function that democratic constitutions shape the political profile of constitutional 
subjects. The infrastructures devised by democratic constitutions are certainly expected to recognise the plurality 
of political preferences existing in the society.
85
 But democratic constitutions pursue a more ambitious notion of 
political pluralism: by legitimating the interests and aspirations of a party, they explicitly invite its opponents to 
engage with them and recognise their legitimacy. Democratic constitutions, in other words, are not simply 
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frameworks legitimating the interests of factions impermeable to the claims of their opponents. Democratic 
constitutions instil in political subjects of all inclinations a discipline of recognition and, by doing so, they 
transform factious individuals into partisans, i.e. political subjects that, in formulating and pursuing their 
particular version of the public good, take into account the vital interests of their opponents.
86
  
The contribution of supranational law to the political profile of the constitutional subject, instead, is much less 
conspicuous.
87
 The notion of participation suffers important limitations evident first of all in the disenfranchised 
condition of migrants in host states. As said, supranational law secures them access and equal treatment in the 
welfare of the host states but, critically, no chances of participating to its political determination.  
More restrictions to political rights emerge in the structure of supranational decision-making. Unlike national 
governments in constitutional democracies, supranational political institutions enjoy reduced political latitude. 
This is in part a consequence of the administrative ethos surrounding supranational policy-making,
88
 in part of 
the more assertive definition of regulatory strategies in the treaties. For a long time supranational political 
institutions will exercise their discretion in the interstices of the treaty, often codifying or articulating regulatory 
solutions half-backed by courts.
89
 
Other structural elements make political participation less significant in supranational decision-making. The 
reduced political capacity deriving from unanimity voting is a major obstacle to supranational policy-making and 
political mobilisation.
90
 But also the mediated legitimacy of supranational political institutions contributes to 
their scarce appeal.
91
 In the period reviewed policy making is dominated by executives which, at best, can ensure 
only some degree of indirect representation to the interests of national political majorities. National political 
minorities, instead, are offered only the opportunity of an indirect and weak involvement through the European 
Parliament. Difficult to expect from a similar institutional framework the type of social integration experienced 
in national parliaments. In supranational policy-making, the prevalent ethos is one of negotiation, where the 
dynamics of partisanship are replaced by intergovernmental bargaining.
92
 
Nevertheless, it would be unfair to supranational law to disqualify entirely its participatory qualities. At least in 
one field – judicial politics – supranational law reveals a significant capacity of mobilisation. The enforcement of 
market freedoms appeals to a selected legal community interested in the reformation of the state.
93
 Yet, if  it is 
difficult to deny the civilising function of many of the judgments resulting from this litigation,
94
 it is easy also to 
note that the type of participation implied by this process contradicts the political profile of the constitutional 
subject as shaped by national democratic constitutions. For all its merit in constraining the protectionist excesses 
of the states, therefore, judicial politics poses also a permanent challenge to the genuine exercise of political 
rights. 
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European citizenship as the synergy between the constitutional subject and economic subjectivity 
In the social state era the subjectification of the citizen in European public law gravitates towards the 
constitutional subject, the subjectivity defined by national constitutional democracies. This subjectivity thrives in 
an institutional framework providing ample resources for collective identification, a rich set of fundamental 
rights and extensive opportunities of political engagement. In the same period, supranational law generates a 
complimentary strategy of subjectification centred on the economic qualities of individuals. In all the relevant 
dimensions of belonging, rights and participation economic subjectivity defies the identity of the constitutional 
subject: it fails to generate a collective sense of belongingness, its right endowment is restricted to free 
movement and equal treatment, its political profile is negligible. Yet, despite all these incongruences, European 
public law benefits from the synergy between its constitutive governmental projects. This is ensured by the 
separation of competences between supranational law and constitutional democracies which minimises the 
episodes of conflict. Within its limited scope, supranational law increases the inclusiveness of national 
constitutional democracies and reduces their vulnerability to economic interdependence.
95
 Economic 
subjectivity, therefore, complements the constitutional subject
96
 without obscuring its symbolical prevalence.
97
 
The transformation of the constitutional subject under ‘advanced liberalism’ 
In the period from the ratification of the Single European Act to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
European public law experiences profound changes mainly related to the evolution of its supranational 
component. Firstly, the Union is enlarged to include 28 member states. To strengthen its political capacity, 
qualified majority voting in the Council is introduced and later generalised, rendering the Union a much more 
effective source of governance. Secondly, successive waves of treaty amendment expand the range of EU policy 
objectives, extending supranational integration towards more salient policy fields such as monetary, economic 
and social policy.
98
 Although in the newly acquired competences the Union is expected essentially to sustain
99
 or 
coordinate
100
 national policies,
101
 the proliferation of objectives reconfigures its original market identity and 
challenges the separation of competences on which the relationship between supranational law and constitutional 
democracies had previously rested. Thirdly, European public law experiments a new form of equilibrium 
resulting from the convergence between its constitutive components. Constitutional symbolism and democratic 
institutional formulas are appropriated by supranational law; market principles and executive law-making find 
their way within national constitutional orders.  The common direction of these changes is the ‘advanced 
liberalism’ agenda,102 an ambitious programme of welfare state reform aiming at strengthening the 
competitiveness of national economies.
103
 The embrace of advanced liberalism and convergence, however, are 
gradual processes in which the original identities of supranational law and constitutional democracy reveal 
sticky. The transition from the social state to advanced liberalism takes place more through stratification than 
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replacement of paradigms.
104
 This causes persisting divergences between those governmental projects and a 
sense of unsettledness and potential conflict characterising European public law in this phase. 
The European reframing of national political communities 
Among the changes in supranational law impinging upon subjectivity, the appropriation of the concept of 
citizenship stands as the most prominent. It is through citizenship that the ambition to politicise the Union finds 
one of its clearest expressions;
105
 most of all, it is through that concept that the Union manifests the aspiration to 
transform its governmental pressures on individuals: from economic individuals to constitutional subjects, from 
privileged migrants to citizens dictating the patterns of social and political life in the Union.
106
 Within this 
mindset, each national is viewed as affiliated with multiple polities, and the Union imagined as a would-be 
supranational constitutional democracy capable of nourishing a sense of collective identification.
107
  
The impact of citizenship on the original structures of supranational law has produced more uncertain results. 
Already its legal definition
108
 is ambiguous as to its actual political nature when it prioritises free movement and 
residence over political rights.
109
 EU citizenship, indeed, provides elements in support of goals as disparate as 
building a supranational society existing alongside national polities and strengthening the protection of migrants 
in host member states regardless their economic qualification.
110
 More than twenty years after its introduction, it 
can safely be said that EU citizenship explicates its potential more as an integrative than a constitutive tool.
111
 
Legislation has defined it ‘the fundamental status of nationals of the member states when they exercise their right 
of free movement and residence’.112 The Court of Justice has employed it as an autonomous source of rights,113 
stretching the protection of EU law towards situations and subjects previously outside the remit of economic 
freedoms.
114
 EU citizenship has extended both the subjective
115
 and the objective
116
 scope of equal treatment 
obligations, including in national welfare states also economically inactive non-nationals insofar as they do not 
become an unreasonable burden.
117
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If we move to its constitutive potential, the record of EU citizenship is far less impressive. Since its introduction 
EU citizenship has neither triggered a shift in collective identification towards Europe
118
 nor rivalled national 
citizenship as a form of belonging.
119
 This has emerged in the elaboration of the Constitutional Treaty, the most 
daring attempt to adopt constitutionalism as the EU form of power.
120
 As widely known, a similar undertaking 
had been promoted to strengthen the legitimacy of the Union before the enlargement to Central-Eastern 
Europe.
121
 Constitutionalism was expected to legitimise a more majoritarian institutional setting and secure 
loyalty to EU law.
122
 The Constitutional Treaty was the vehicle to promote the transition from an 
intergovernmental to a genuinely constitutional political community conceived in political and civic rather than 
ethno-cultural terms.
123
 It is telling, however, that even that document and the whole constitutional undertaking 
were never intended as the products of a true pouvoir constituant exercised in the name of a single European 
people.
124
 In other words, the Constitutional Treaty was never meant to challenge national political communities 
as it was undisputed that constitutional authority resided in the member states.
125
 Had the Constitutional Treaty 
been ratified by all member states, the EU would however have expressed an uneven and truncated form of 
constitutionalism.
126
  
The constitutional adventure proved once more that the Union does not possess a single political community,
127
 
and that in contemporary Europe national demoi are entrenched and dominant.
128
 Yet European citizens 
constitute more than a disaggregated multitude incapable of collective self-determination. The Union can be 
viewed as a demoicracy, i.e. a polity of multiple demoi
129
 developing a distinct and discrete model of democracy 
antithetic to both the supranational and national versions of a single demos.
130
 National political communities 
give rise no longer to self-serving constitutional democracies; they are joined together in a collective 
transnational political undertaking. In this perspective, EU treaties can be reconceptualised and regarded as 
social contracts between European peoples.
131
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The constitutional function of Union citizenship, therefore, is not that of merging European individuals in an 
indistinct supranational polity. Union citizenship changes the understanding of national membership:
132
 while it 
leaves intact the conditions for national membership, it transforms its substantive and political substance.
133
 In 
this light, EU citizenship is not ontologically independent from nationality; it becomes a constitutive element of 
it and contributes to its European reframing.
134
 
The notion and function of EU citizenship are echoed in a number of national constitutions, particularly those 
which have introduced integration clauses
135
 devoted specifically to EU membership.
136
 Such norms codify the 
specific status and operative properties of EU law, they interface national institutional settings with the most 
salient aspects of EU decision-making and they dictate the conditions under which EU membership is 
legitimate.
137
 Most importantly, integration clauses certify that EU membership is not the product of contingent 
political majorities, but is a more structural decision widely shared by a national polity
138
. Conceived in this way, 
integration clauses lay the ground for an EU-oriented redefinition of national constitutional frameworks and for a 
corresponding transformation of the contents and political significance of the constitutional subject. 
The market metamorphosis of national welfare states 
From a substantive standpoint, reframing the constitutional subject in an EU light entails a set of 
transformational pressures on national welfare states enhancing the economic qualities of the individual. The 
degree of transformation achieved depends on the varying intensity of EU policy measures and their actual 
implementation by the member states. Nonetheless, the main trajectories of this process can be explored by 
looking at the policy goals and style of intervention by the Union in a range of welfare sectors.
139
 
Before delving into more detailed examination, few words are needed to clarify the relationship of the Union 
with the social domain. As said, in the period reviewed the Union expands towards the social sphere,
140
 but it 
does so without establishing a supranational welfare state system.
141
 The Union lacks the possibility to raise 
significant revenues through direct taxation and redistribute them as services or benefits. With a small budget (at 
least if compared to national ones),
142
 the Union approaches the social sphere through a peculiar set of tools. 
Initially, EU social measures are designed simply to flank the single market project.
143
 Next, the Union 
adventures into more salient policy fields appealing to constituencies interested in welfare reform according to a 
new ideological paradigm termed ‘advanced liberalism’.144 The focal point of the new policy agenda is 
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governing through the entrepreneurship of individuals.
145
 In the pursuit of this objective, advanced liberalism 
does not promote the dismantlement of the welfare state and a return to laissez-faire; social policies are re-
oriented to create the conditions for entrepreneurship and competitiveness.
146
 This implies several initiatives 
such as policies enabling a market to exist and function without disproportionate hurdles and an efficiency-
driven reorganization of social government. Most importantly, governmental resources are employed to prompt 
an anthropological turn in the individual, increasingly pressured to envision his or herself as an entrepreneur.
147
 
At least in principle, the strongest traction towards welfare reform derives from the Economic and Monetary 
Union and the ensuing constraints on national budgets. Within the EMU, supranational rules are established to 
prevent excessive deficits and reduce public debt.
148
 The goal of sound finances inspires policies of fiscal 
retrenchment favouring higher taxation and lower levels of social expenditure. But because of free movement 
and tax competition, higher taxes apply in particular to immobile factors of production.
149
 No surprise that 
overall these policies contribute to increased inequality within national societies.
150
 
The market metamorphosis of national welfare states is also the product of a broader enforcement of market 
freedoms.
151
 Under EU law influence, the state monopoly on public services is challenged and private provision 
encouraged.
152
 The extension of market freedoms towards national social measures is premised on the need for 
national administration to control more strictly welfare expenditures. This leads to a more accurate determination 
of the price of any single social provision, which in the logic of the single market amounts to services 
remuneration.
153
 Once market freedoms are triggered, individuals begin to feel entitled to an invisible welfare 
voucher,
154
 to be used in other member states or private providers.
155
 So, a market of social services emerges in 
which the constitutional subject is converted into a welfare consumer.
156
 Within a similar context an alternative 
idea of self-determination is cultivated: while in the social state the potential of the individual was mainly 
channelled towards voice and collective political action, in the market of welfare services self-determination is 
expressed mainly through individual choice and portability of benefits.
157
 
If the EMU and the single market constrain respectively the size and structure of welfare states, their 
reorientation towards competitiveness and entrepreneurship is sought through EU social policy. To improve the 
competitiveness of national economies, EU social policy urges national social government to encourage the 
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participation of individuals to the economy.
158
 Empowerment emerges as the overriding goal of welfare 
reform,
159
 exposing individuals to increasing demands
160
 of becoming well-functioning participants of the 
competitive market society in the making.
161
 In this logic, social policies are mobilised to assist the individual in 
a ceaseless work of training and retraining, enhancing its career credentials and the continuous economic 
capitalization of the self required by advanced liberalism.
162
 
Labour law and industrial relations are the privileged fields where the agenda of advanced liberalism is 
experimented.
163
 While in the social state these branches of social organisation contributed to the overall 
function of redistributing power and economic resources, in the new governmental landscape they are expected 
to contribute to competitiveness and economic performance.
164
 The discredit of social conflict and emphasis on 
social cooperation are the side-effects of this policy recalibration.
165
 The role of social rights undergoes a 
complete redefinition: if social rights in the social state were both guarantees and achievements of social conflict, 
in advanced liberalism they are reshaped to facilitate market performances.
166
 Thus, anti-discriminatory 
measures are conceived not just to contrast conducts per se despicable, but to purify the market from state 
measures or private behaviours which may affect negatively human capital.
167
 This process of latent 
commodification marks also the restructuring of education,
168
 and even security and public order are reframed to 
reassure the consumer society from the uneasiness generated by terrorism and migration.
169
  
Yet, the departure of EU social policy from the original tenet of the social state of emancipating individuals is 
most evident in the field of social exclusion. Combating social exclusion in the social state era entailed creating a 
negative freedom from the market
170
 and striving for the inclusion of individuals in a complex web of political, 
economic and social relations.
171
 In the new context, instead, what is sought is not full human emancipation. 
Advanced liberalism contrasts social exclusion essentially to bring marginalised individuals back into the 
market. EU social policies may well resituate individuals in this environment,
172
 but they leave unaffected the 
competitive situation.
173
 In advanced liberalism, therefore, social policy does not correct or limit the market;
174
 it 
continues to be functional to its efficient operation.
175
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The corrosion of political citizenship 
The image of individuals more active in the market while less involved in civic life is confirmed by the gradual 
corrosion of the political profile of the constitutional subject. The expansion of EU competences empowers 
national executives vis-à-vis national parliaments and restricts the room for the unfettered exercise of national 
political rights.
176
 In the newly acquired policy areas national governments retain considerable control over 
Union decision-making.
177
 Only rarely this results in complete pre-emption of national democratic spaces.  More 
often EU measures allow significant margins to national policy-makers to accommodate their contents to their 
particular social and political context. The influence exercised by the Union, however, is by no means negligible: 
even in the softest of the coordinating processes specific policy directions are prescribed, enlisting national 
political processes in the structural change undertaking.
178
 
It could be contended that the erosion of national spaces of democratic deliberation is compensated by the 
politicisation of EU decision-making processes and the appropriation of constitutional symbolism. In other 
words, what the individual qua constitutional subject loses is regained by the individual qua EU citizen. Yet, it is 
doubtful that EU citizenship can make up for the losses of the constitutional subject. Notwithstanding their more 
pronounced involvement in the social life of the host state, EU citizens remain passive agents deprived of any 
meaningful political capacity.
179
 Critically, also their actual democratic engagement with supranational decision-
making can seriously be questioned. 
Admittedly, in the period reviewed the Union has not only strengthened its governmental capacity, but has made 
major progresses in making its political process more accessible and contested. The idea of representative 
democracy as well as the state tradition of political rights have been appropriated leading to a profound 
restructuring of the EU institutional setting.
180
 From the first direct elections onwards the European Parliament 
has always grown in influence up to achieving equal standing with the Council.
181
 It plays a critical role in 
legislation,
182
 especially in amending legislative proposals,
183
 and it has induced a reorganization of 
supranational political life along the left-right divide.
184
 But the democratic transformation of the Union has not 
been confined to the Parliament. The architecture of the legislative process resembles that of federal bicameral 
systems.
185
 The political profile of the Commission has also been strengthened,
186
 as witnessed by the recent 
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imitation of practices drawn from the parliamentary government tradition as the indication of Spitzen-
kandidaten.
187
 
But for all these progresses, the democratic substance of EU citizenship remains underdeveloped if compared to 
that of the constitutional subject. This is not just because in areas as crucial as economic governance or foreign 
policy the influence of the European Parliament is feebler. Besides the formal deficiencies contained in the 
treaties, there are further criticalities impairing the democratic qualities of supranational decision-making. There 
is first of all an issue of political latitude. Because of the purposive framing of many of its competences,
188
 EU 
law does not allow contestation for the direction of EU policies, but enables competition only over the means to 
reach pre-defined objectives.
189
 There is then a problem of evacuation of representative democracy.
190
 The 
enhanced democratic quality of legislative decision-making has been coupled by broad delegation of regulatory 
powers to political administration or private law-making,
191
 circuits in which democratic engagement is 
notoriously more difficult. There is finally an issue of legislative culture. The practice of trialogues and first-
reading agreements
192
 has improved the productivity of the EU legislative,
193
 but has also lowered its democratic 
quality. Because of the increased role of COREPER, the accountability of national executives has diminished;
194
 
the opacity of those processes and the reduced role of smaller political groups have also undermined the chances 
of meaningful political opposition.
195
 
The evacuation of legislative decision-making, restricted political latitude and consociational legislative culture 
are all elements converging towards the narrowing down of the scope for political contestation and opposition.
196
 
Within such a political environment, the conflictual but, in the end, integrative practices associated with 
partisanship are made more difficult. The discontents of the ‘advanced liberalism’ agenda and, more in general, 
the ‘politically other’ are viewed not as opponents bearing legitimate political claims, but as enemies obstructing 
or undermining the transformation promoted by the Union. Over the corrosion of the constitutional subject, 
therefore, looms the prospect of increased alienation and intractable antagonistic conflicts.
197
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The transition towards ‘advanced liberalism’: the competition between economic and constitutional 
subjectivities 
As the Union expands its remit, national constitutional subjects are exposed to transformational pressures 
targeting national welfare states. The appropriation by the EU of constitutional concepts results more in their 
vulgarization than in a genuine democratic conversion of supranational law. Yet, that appropriation fulfils more 
than a decorative function. Constitutional symbolism eases the transformation of the constitutional subject and, 
ultimately, sustains a competing notion of freedom and self-determination in European public law.
198
 Under EU 
influence, national citizenship is revisited and enhanced in its economic qualities. But enabled in the market, 
individuals are disabled in the political sphere. The subjectivity brought about by the Union under advanced 
liberalism, therefore, may be successful in countering some deficiencies of the constitutional subject, but 
contains also an economic bias which may threaten values such as democracy and social justice. 
The transition from the social to the enabling state, however, takes place gradually and unevenly. It is marked by 
ambiguities inspiring divaricated political narratives. The transformation of the constitutional subject can be 
presented either as the purification from its original biases or the undermining of its authentic commitment to 
social justice and political freedom. Likewise, resistances to transformation can be described either as the 
reaffirmation of fundamental human values against the decline of constitutional democracy or the entrenchment 
of the dysfunctions of traditional welfare state. In this phase, European public law does not resolve these 
ambiguities. Rather, owing to its pluralist structure, it offers an institutional setting which, at least in principle, 
permits the representation, confrontation and mediation of the normative claims underlying the constitutional 
subject and its transformation. The resulting tension replaces the peaceful co-existence registered between the 
constitutional subject and economic subjectivity in the social state era. Yet it would be misleading to consider 
this competition as necessarily a source of disintegration. On the contrary, the tension between constitutional and 
economic subjectivities could operate as a promising antidote to resist their hegemonic temptations and counter 
their respective biases. However, this scenario will not be consolidated in the last evolutionary stage of European 
public law. Under the institutional setting developed to cope with the financial crisis, European public law 
begins to resolve its in-built ambiguities. Thus, most of the institutional resources will be more univocally 
addressed to the transformation of the constitutional subject, while the pursuit of rival claims will remain 
possible only in the form of unilateral reaffirmations of national constitutional identity.
199
     
The twilight of the constitutional subject during the financial crisis 
The evolutionary trends registered in the affirmation of the advanced liberalism agenda come to a head with the 
institutional arrangements designed to cope with the ongoing financial crisis. Underpinning a similar 
development is a diagnosis whereby the crisis exposed structural weaknesses in national economies,
200
 especially 
in the countries that failed to implement the advanced liberalism agenda. Hence, institutional design and policy 
reactions are framed to embolden the transformational commitment of the Union: if in the short term financial 
stability at national level is promoted through plans of fiscal consolidation and measures of financial 
assistance,
201
 in the medium and long term advanced liberalism is regarded as the agenda to be inculcated to 
recalcitrant member states through more stringent direction and control of national political economies.
202
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Justified as it may be on policy grounds, however, this strategy materialises the dangers and aggravates the 
biases already noted in European public law before the crisis. 
Looking in more detail at the changes introduced during the financial crisis, the restructuring of European public 
law entails first of all a further expansion of EU competences,
203
 in many cases beyond the limits established in 
the Lisbon Treaty.
204
 In expanding its scope, the Union abandons almost completely the lofty rhetoric employed 
before the crisis. Set aside the constitutional register, the Union shows its crudest intergovernmental and 
technocratic profile by extending its regulatory style to even more salient policy fields to promote the degree of 
convergence of national economies required by a single monetary policy.
205
 As a result, national economic and 
social policies are subjected to more intensive policy coordination.
206
 Multilateral surveillance on national 
budgets is secured through stricter sanctions
207
 and structural reforms are encouraged by the promise of more 
relaxed fiscal discipline.
208
 The consequence of this institutional setting is that in the pursuit of economic 
convergence member states will follow different routes reflecting their particular financial and economic 
situations. As a reflection, also the meaning of being a citizen in Europe will vary considerably from state to 
state implying distinct collective efforts, but also different strategies of resistance and contestation. 
Towards national post-political communities 
Before the financial crisis it was reasonable to believe that only political events of considerable magnitude could 
induce European individuals to shift their prevalent national allegiance to a supranational political community. 
After more than five years of economic and political distress, it can safely be said that the financial crisis has 
neither awaken a European demos nor encouraged the establishment of robust solidarity ties between the peoples 
of Europe.
209
 European integration is certainly implicated in the enormous sacrifices imposed in the management 
of the crisis, but the Union has failed to provide a pan-European narrative inspiring those efforts. Europeans 
continue to regard as predominant their national allegiances: they have made sacrifices on behalf of their 
national communities, and the only pan-European imperative forcing them into change has been economic 
necessity.
210
 
The incapacity of the financial crisis to prompt a shift in collective identification is easily explained by its very 
disparate impact on national economies. National political communities are experiencing the crisis in highly 
different ways. The strengths and shortcomings of the respective social models have been amplified; as a 
reflection, also the required degree of reformation of state structures has been variable ranging from the 
negligible to the almost complete. Thus, legal arrangements to cope with the crisis have been tailored to specific 
national situations with the result of deepening existing divides and generating new ones. The cleavage between 
                                                     
203
 M. Dawson and F. de Witte, ‘Constitutional Balance in the EU after the Euro-Crisis’ (2013) 76 Modern Law Review, 824-
826. See also C. J. Bickerton, above n. 14, 141-150, explaining this process as the creation of more horizontal ties 
between national governments to shield macro-economic policy-making from the intrusion of mobilized and angry 
societies. 
204
 Article 9 TSCG establishes policy coordination “in all the areas which are essential to the proper functioning of the euro 
area”. See also the ‘Euro Plus Pact’, above n. 202, 14-15, dictating actions in areas where the competence lies with the 
member states such as wage setting arrangements, education systems, pension, health and social assistance. In addition, 
article 4 of the regulation 1176/2011 extends policy surveillance by supranational institutions towards private 
indebtedness, housing market and energy. Finally, the ‘Compact for Growth and Jobs’, 9, calls for reform in the field of 
public administration and justice. 
205
 D. Chalmers, ‘The European Redistributive State and a European Law of Struggle’ (2012) 18 European Law Journal, 
685. 
206
 See ‘Euro Plus Pact’, above n. 202, 13-15. 
207
 See the system of quasi-automatic approval of sanctions established by regulation 1173/2011 and article 7 TSCG. 
208
 See, for instance, article 2a of regulation 1466/97 as amended by regulation 1175/2011. 
209
 A. J. Menéndez, above n. 26, 930-931. 
210
 M. Wilkinson, ‘The Specter of Authoritarian Liberalism: reflections on the Constitutional Crisis of the European Union’ 
(2013) 14 German Law Journal, 551-552. See also C. J. Bickerton, above n. 14, 114. 
 20 
member states participating and non participating in the Euro has been widened. A more problematic divide has 
emerged between the member states at the supply and receiving ends of the newly introduced mechanisms of 
financial assistance.   
The strategy to cope with the financial crisis has not only reinforced national collective identification; it has 
undermined the legitimacy of the Union itself. The legitimacy crisis of the Union was diagnosed well before the 
financial crisis. Already with the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht it was felt that the appeal of the original 
ideals of peace and prosperity was declining and that the Union was becoming a source of social resentment.
211
 
Disaffection was felt in particular by non mobile citizens: to their eyes, the Union appeared as a class project 
dominated by a small and economically privileged cosmopolitan elite epitomising all the dangers threatening 
their way of life.
212
 Economic integration did not turn these individuals into Europeans, but instead reinforced 
their attachment to national and local political communities.
213
 As the financial crisis exposes the difficulties of 
the Union in both representing the European citizenry and delivering the promised economic and social goods,
214
 
the ranks of this constituency have simply engrossed. As a result, the Union has ended up catalysing more 
resentment: from being seen as a body helping constitutional democracies to live up to their ideals, it is 
increasingly viewed as an agent contributing to their dissolution. 
Even without subscribing to all the claims of the old and new discontents of European integration, it can be 
conceded that the institutional setting introduced in response to the financial crisis, by undermining both the 
welfare state and national democratic constitutions, degrades the environment which initially enabled the 
affirmation of the constitutional subject. Particularly in the hardest hit member states, the transformation of the 
welfare state has been synonym for increases in taxation and drastic cuts in health-care services, pensions and 
social benefits.
215
 This has not only had the effect of lowering the level of social protection ensured to 
individuals; by weakening welfare state structures, also their capacity of generating loyalty and collective 
identification has been dangerously compromised.
216
 
If possible, the impact of the new institutional arrangements on national democratic constitutions is even more 
alarming. Because of the expansion of EU competences, the scope of application of democratic constitutions is 
further reduced. As a consequence, increasing sectors of economic and social policy are subjected to the process 
of technocratic depoliticization inherent in EU policy-making.
217
 This emerges in the degree of constraints 
imposed on national decision-making. Especially in the hardest hit member states, policy directions are 
prescribed in such a detail to pre-empt national parliaments of any meaningful role.
218
 Due to their incapacity to 
deliver on the advanced liberalism agenda, national peoples are increasingly treated as multitudes to be ruled 
rather than polities to be enhanced for their efforts in collective self-determination.
219
 This not only makes more 
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difficult for those resisting this policy agenda to identify with the Union, but it also erodes the legitimacy of 
national constitutional democracies. 
A case in point is the prioritisation by the Union of the goal of financial stability
220
 and, in particular, the 
mandated incorporation of balanced budget rules in national constitutions.
221
 Irrespective of its actual legal 
meaning, this obligation has been equated in public debates to the constitutionalisation of austerity,
222
 a divisive 
policy goal weakening the integration capacity traditionally associated with constitutional democracy. From 
being documents institutionalising the conflicts between opposing views of the public good, national 
constitutions are transformed into documents entrenching a single vision of it.
223
 Economic and social policy are 
no longer regarded as the ground where alternative political views compete for political consensus; they are 
transformed into a more arid terrain where targets are dictated and national policy performances are measured.
224
 
Under the public law of the financial crisis, the transformation of national political communities brought about 
by the Union acquires a post-political character.
225
 It ushers in a distinct ethos according to which partisan 
conflicts are regarded as a thing of the past and are silently replaced by a new common sense in which the 
political is played out in the moral register: in place of a struggle between right and left, post-politics unfolds as a 
struggle between right and wrong.
226
 The resulting legal and political order can hardly fit with the requirements 
of a democratic constitution. Post-politics, indeed, operates an inversion between the place of partisanship and 
the role of the constitution. The constitution is no longer the place for an open compromise between left and 
right; it is the locus in which what is right is uncompromisingly established. Within the post-political vision, 
therefore, the room for legitimate political contestation is narrowed down, relegating politics (or what remains of 
it) essentially to the implementation of a pre-defined constitutional project. Opponents of this project are 
regarded as enemies and no longer adversaries for, in the new institutional environment, their claims are 
illegitimate and against the course of history.
227
 By drawing the political frontier in this way, however, the post-
political vision is not conducive to a vibrant democratic life; it generates alienation and intractable antagonism 
between the institutional establishment and its marginalised opponents. What is worse, post-politics resurrects 
internal political exclusions and, by doing so, it gives up the promise of political freedom and collective 
identification inherent in the idea of constitutional democracy.  
Fundamental rights under the shadow of macroeconomic indicators 
The impact of the public law of the crisis on the constitutional subject is visible also in her rights dimension. The 
most evident process taking place in this regard is the proliferation of macroeconomic indicators and the 
corresponding downscaling of fundamental rights.
228
 Admittedly, even before the crisis macroeconomic criteria 
and quantitative assessment of policy-making played a major role in supranational law making. The public law 
of the crisis buttresses and generalises this trend. National legislative processes are wrapped up in a web of 
thresholds and ceilings, as much more intricate as critical is the financial situation of a member state. This is can 
be appreciated, for instance, in the discipline of national budgets. The reformed “Growth and Stability Pact” 
establishes that each member state defines every three years a medium-term balance objective (MTBO) to be 
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attained in subsequent stability programmes.
 229
 For member states participating in the Euro, the lower limit of 
structural deficit is 0.5% of the GDP.
230
 In order to achieve their MTBO, member states are required to improve 
annually their cyclically adjusted budget balance of 0.5% or more.
231
 Member states whose public debt exceeds 
60% of the GDP have to reduce it at a pace of one twentieth per year.
232
 Further numerical criteria are laid down 
in the rules on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances,
 
where a scoreboard to detect them is 
established.
233
 The same quantitative approach is used to measure national performances in the competitiveness 
agenda,
234
 as if, in a Union unable to sustain the conflict between alternative policy options, the only available 
course of action is the calculation of the progresses and delays of each member state in an uncontroversial 
schedule. 
The rise of hyper-specialised language and the thickening of legal constraints on political freedom are just the 
most evident consequences of the proliferation of macroeconomic indicators. More profound are the effects in 
the role and degree of protection of fundamental rights. As anticipated, the rise of macroeconomic indicators 
entails the marginalization of fundamental rights. This is not just a matter of lexicon and institutional landscape, 
but it is a judicially certified reality. Unlike in other policy areas,
235
 when it comes to measures of 
macroeconomic adjustment the Court of Justice shows no anxiety to expand the reach of the EU Charter of 
fundamental rights.
236
 Also the Commission seems reluctant to export the culture of fundamental rights to the 
coordination of economic policies.
237
 Yet replacing or downscaling fundamental rights comes at a high price 
going beyond the deterioration of the levels of protection. Renouncing to rights means also renouncing to their 
structural function of representing social tensions and legitimating alternative political responses to them.
238
 
To be sure, in the vacuum of guarantees left by supranational institutions, some degree of social protection can 
be regained through national constitutional courts.
239
 Moreover, more recent pieces of macroeconomic 
legislation may have the effect of enlarging the protection of the Charter precisely to the areas neglected by the 
Court of Justice and the Commission.
240
 Yet, both forms of rehabilitation of fundamental rights entail just a mere 
recalibration of the dominant institutional culture. Even the most daring judgments of national constitutional 
courts do not oppose fiscal retrenchment as a legitimate policy objective,
241
 but they ensure a modicum of social 
protection against the most disproportionate legislative measures or those affecting the most vulnerable segments 
of the society. By re-embedding fundamental rights in the new institutional environment, therefore, these 
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attempts have a paradoxical effect:  they make austerity more sustainable
242
 and, ultimately, legitimate it as the 
exclusive policy direction.
243
    
The demise of political citizenship 
Debilitated in the rights dimension, the constitutional subject suffers from strong restrictions also on its capacity 
to participate to political decisions. The deterioration of its political profile is certainly the result of the more 
assertive definition of policy targets and the proliferation of macroeconomic criteria. But also the procedures 
introduced to control and steer national economic and social policy add to the disease. 
This emerges in the newly adopted system of multilateral supervision of national budgets. To ensure financial 
stability, EU legislation establishes a system of surveillance on the budget cycle through the European 
semester
244
 and, for the member states participating in the Euro, the common budgetary timeline.
245
 According to 
these procedures, budgetary activities carried out in national parliaments are closely monitored by the 
Commission and the ECOFIN to secure fiscal discipline. Thus, in the event of significant deviations from the 
MTBO during the European semester, the Commission and the ECOFIN issue respectively a warning and a 
recommendation.
246
 If the deviating member state fails to take appropriate action, sanctions can be imposed.
247
 In 
the common budgetary timeline, the Commission contributes to the definition of the budget,
248
 to the extent that 
it competes with national parliaments in influencing the choices of national governments.
249
 
Constitutional subjects experience more stringent constraints in case of complications in the financial situation of 
their member states. Supranational law prescribes enhanced surveillance for member states in financial 
difficulties,
250
 for those receiving financial assistance
251
 or experiencing macroeconomic imbalances.
252
 In all 
these circumstances, enhanced surveillance encourages member states to address the causes of their 
difficulties.
253
 If needed, the Council recommends precautionary measures or specific programmes of 
macroeconomic adjustment.
254
 If their financial situation becomes unsustainable, member states may even be 
asked to enter in specific programmes to correct their fiscal policy and recover economic capacity.
255
  
The procedure leading to the adoption of these programmes is quite standardised: the interested member state 
formulates a proposal with the assistance of the Commission, the ECB and the IMF; on that basis, the Council 
establishes the guidelines of structural reform and the member state at issue agrees to implement them under 
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close surveillance of the Commission, the IMF and the ECB.
256
 Nowhere supranational legislation requires the 
approval of these programmes by national parliaments. What is worse, the Council can decide unilaterally on 
any change of the programme in case of a significant gap between macroeconomic forecasts and realized 
figures.
257
  
As a result, particularly in countries subject to these programmes, citizens are de facto assigned a politically 
diminished status. The assumption is that they will regain full political capacity only with the complete 
implementation of the advanced liberalism agenda. In this way, full exercise of political rights becomes a good 
to be deserved. In certain member states, therefore, it can be safely said that national parliaments are in control 
of financial decisions.
258
 In other ones, owing to the constraints imposed by supranational law, similar statements 
would appear devoid of substance. 
The diminished political role of the constitutional subject finds little compensation in supranational decision-
making processes. The public law of the crisis strengthens the role of intergovernmental and technocratic 
institutions.
259
 The European Council is the focal point in the articulation of both the financial stability
260
 and 
competitiveness strategies.
261
 The Commission and ECOFIN are involved essentially for their expertise in 
monitoring and steering member states action.
262
 In a similar context, ensuring parliamentary accountability and 
exercising some form of political opposition is extremely difficult. The European Parliament is excluded from 
the decisions regarding financial assistance, while its role in policy coordination
263
 and the surveillance of 
national budgets
264
 is marginal.
265
 Finally, also national parliaments are inadequately engaged in supranational 
decision-making, given that their only opportunity to interact with EU institutions is that of setting up hearings 
of those involved in multilateral surveillance.
266
 
Citizenship on the wane: transformation and resistances 
For all its possible merits in fostering financial stability and competitiveness, the institutional setting devised in 
response to the financial crisis impairs the qualities of the constitutional subject. The core institutions generating 
national loyalty are weakened and no supranational substitute is offered. Rights are overshadowed by an 
uncompromising macroeconomic raison d’état, and also participation is frustrated in the constrained spaces 
allowed by EU regulatory settings.  
As the post-political order promoted by supranational law becomes hegemonic, constitutional subjects are left 
with the dilemma of surrendering to the transformation or resisting to it.
267
 Until now, acquiescence and political 
resignation have been the most widespread attitudes of those enduring the effects of the crisis and its 
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management,
268
 although clear symptoms of hostility and antagonism against the Union and national political 
elites have emerged too.
269
 Compared with the previous evolutionary phase, however, the EU institutional setting 
is less amenable to resistances. To counter the corrosion of the constitutional subject, unilateral invocations of 
national constitutional identity inspired by an ethic of constitutional resistance have become more common. The 
social and democratic claims underlying the constitutional subject are increasingly voiced
270
 in order to erect 
barricades against technocratic encroachment.
271
 Outsiders of European integration have tried to enlist in this 
strategy also national constitutional courts,
272
 even though these attempts have so far produced only limited 
corrections to the predominant course of action.
 273  
 Thus, as supranational law proceeds almost unhindered 
towards consolidating its predominance, the chances of re-establishing a more balanced relationship between 
political citizenship and economic subjectivity appear on the decline. 
Conclusion 
The proposed excursus on the subjectification of the citizen in European public law contradicts conventional 
understandings portraying the evolution of EU citizenship as a progressive narrative.
274
 Changes in the 
relationships between supranational law and constitutional democracy have generated a trajectory in which the 
constitutional subject, from being predominant on economic subjectivity, has become subservient to it. It is 
difficult to predict whether and how this trend will be reversed. Perhaps, we should start to realise that the 
constitutional subject is the product of particular historical circumstances and an institutional culture which in 
the current social, economic and political situation are difficult to replicate.  
The twilight of the constitutional subject might be the price to be paid to complete the transition from the social 
state to advanced liberalism. This outcome will be achieved when supranational law and constitutional 
democracy will align completely their governmental strategies and resolve the ambiguities and competition 
existing between economic and constitutional subjectivity. It is clear that, at the end of this journey, we should 
end up with a single and unequivocal notion of citizenship conforming to the advanced liberalism paradigm. 
What is less clear, however, is whether at that point European public law will still be able to provide the 
institutional resources to counter the biases and potential for exclusion of the dominant subjectivity. 
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